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ANALYSIS  AND  PRACTICAL  IMPLICATIONS 
Thi s paper  describes  and  attempts  to  general  ize the practical  imp1 i  ca- 
tions for the design of  monetary policy of some  of the most  popular macro- 
economic  models  incorporating rational expectations.  Perhaps  the most  impor- 
tant of these  implications is  a shift in  the focus of  policy from output or 
interest-rate stabilization toward price-level stabilization. 
The  rational expectations assumption  rules out systematic  expectational 
errors.  The  assumption  proved necessary  to  ensure  consistency of  models  with 
the natural  rate property--that the average  level of  output is invariant with 
respect to  monetary  policy and other monetary phenomena.  Introduction of 
rational expectations overturns the case  for conventional  countercyclical 
policies. 
New  macroeconomic  model s,  which combine  rational expectations with 
el  ther incomplete  information or nominal  contracts,  offer a seemingly  unintel- 
ligible variety of results and  implications  for policy.  The  purpose  of this 
paper  is to  describe the ways  in  which rational expectations fundamentally 
change  monetary  policy analysis and  to attempt  to generalize the implications 
of such  analysis.  To  do  so  effectively,  some  careful  development of  mathe- 
matical  concepts  is indispensable.  For  example,  in  rational expectations 
model s,  expectations are forward-looki  ng  rather than backward-looki  ng.  There- 
fore,  policy must  be  specified as  a contingent rule of  behavior;  that is,  an 
equation relating instruments  to  observed outcomes. 
In  practice,  the analytical problems of  finding the optimal  policy rule 
are virtually insurmountable  except  in  simplified cases.  The  dimensions  of 
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some arbitrary way to  obtain results.  To place various results in perspec- 
tive, it  is essential that the significance of particular  simp1  ifying assump- 
tions be  understood.  Otherwise, interpretations are insecure, ambiguous, and 
seemingly contradictory.  In principle, such problems exist in any class of 
models, but the dynamics of  rational  expectations models pose new and  i 1 l- 
understood analytical  problems.  A  willingness to  grapple with some tricky 
analytical difficulties is essential  to the practical  application of  rational 
expectations models to  policy analysis. 
The analytical  problems may in  part account for the continued popularity 
of pre-rational-expectations IS-LM models.  These are the source of persis- 
tently popular notions concerning policy and form the basis of much empirical 
work, including the large-scale macroeconometric models.  In these models, a 
reasonably well-defined  policy can improve welfare by stabilizing aggregate 
demand.  Under thi  s conventional  countercyclical  pol  icy, the money stock 
depends upon the last observations of  the  (currently  unknown) state of  the 
economy.  A1  so, under plausible assumptions about parameters and relative 
disturbance variances, the money stock should respond positively to  the 
(currently  known)  interest rate.  These IS-LM models had serious problems, 
symptomatic of which was inconsistency with the natural  rate property,  that 
could be corrected only by introducing rational expectations. 
Sargent and Wallace (1975) introduced rational  expectations into an 
otherwise conventional  IS-LM model.  The main result was that, once policy 
effects  operating through systematic expectational  errors were ruled out, 
money supply responses to the state of  the economy were of  no consequence for 
output behavior.  Nevertheless, positive money stock responses to the current 
interest rate could still  be  helpful, as in the pre-rational-expectations 
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the money  stock  infinitely elastic with respect to  the interest rate,  would 
leave  the price level and  the money  stock indeterminate. 
Subsequent  rational expectations models  considered different information 
assumptions  and  different structural  characteristics,  such  as  long-term con- 
tracts or intertemporal  substitution of leisure.  Policies to  improve  welfare 
in  these models  depend  too much  on particulars to provide unambiguous  descrip- 
tions of  optimal  policy rules.  Indeed,  derivation of  the optimal policy 
becomes  an  analytically intractable task,  without somewhat  arbitrary restric- 
tions on either the structure of the economy  or the range of  policy choices 
considered. 
However,  rational expectations models  (except  certain cases  that do not 
possess  the natural rate property)  have  two characteristics with practical 
policy implications:  (1)  an  optimal  policy is  equivalent to  one  that mini- 
mizes  the price level uncertainty of suppliers over various horizons that are 
determined  by information lags and/or  contract lengths,  and  (2) "interest rate 
rules" make  the price level and money  stock  indeterminate. 
The  first section to  follow considers the way  policy objectives and 
choices  are  specified in  rational expectations  models  and notes  some  limita- 
tions and  unresolved analytical problems,  which  are  illustrated in  later 
sections.  Next,  the basis of  prevailing concepts of  policy is shown  to  be 
rooted in the pre-rational-expectations IS-LM  models,  and  the shortcomings of 
those  models  are discussed.  In the next section,  it  is  shown  that rational 
expectations destroys  the case  for the conventional  countercycl i  cal pol i  ci  es , 
but does  not lead to  very specific conclusions about  the optimal  policy rule 
without particular assumptions  about i  nforrnation avai lab1  e to  private and 
public agents.  Non-market-clearing models,  such  as  those  in  which  sellers of 
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are found  to  have  unconventional,  but few general , pol  icy impl  ications.  Fin- 
al  ly,  similar ambiguities are found  in  intertemporal  substitution models.  A 
final  section interprets  the practical pol  icy impl  ications of  rational expec- 
tations models  as  arguing for price stability and  against policies that seek 
to stabilize output or interest rates. 
The  Pol i  cy Problem 
What  Should Monetary Policy's  Objective(s1 Be? 
At  the most  general  level,  the-policy objective can  be  taken as  the 
enhancement  of the welfare of the representative agent  (consumer/factor  sup- 
plier).  Implicit in  different macroeconomic  models  that give a role for 
monetary  policy are different constraints  that impede  agents'  attainment of 
the f i  rst-best economic  outcomes.  Then  pol  icy can  improve  welfare  by  reducing 
the effectiveness  of these  constraints. 
Implicit in  all the major  competing models  is  a common  set of micro- 
economi c assumptions,  which  can  be  briefly described as  fol  lows.  The  welfare 
of  the representative individual  in  the economy  is  specified by  his utility 
function,  which he  maximizes  subject  to  various  constraints.  His utility 
depends  positively upon  the amounts  of consumption and  leisure he  enjoys  in 
each  period,  with future amounts  discounted according to  how  soon  they  will 
occur.  In  addition,  consumption  and  leisure provide declining marginal 
uti  1 i  ty,  so  that individuals display risk aversion--they tend to  prefer,  for 
example,  more  stable patterns of  consumption  and  leisure,over unstable ones, 
for  given present discounted values of consumption and  leisure streams. 
Individuals have  access  to a production function either directly,  or 
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buyers.  The  production function has  labor and  at least one  other (capital  or 
fixed)  factor input,  and  displays decreasing marginal  productivity and  con- 
stant returns to  scale.  In  the absence  of the other constraints  to  be  dis- 
cussed,  individuals can  trade freely in  various markets,  subject to  budget 
constraints. 
Changes  in  productivity and  technology  alone are entirely capable  of 
generating cycles of the kind actual  ly  observed in  developed,  market  econo- 
mies,  even if agents  optimize,  and  even  without the additional constraints 
assumed  in  monetary models  of the business  cycle.  Recent  work  on real 
business cycle models  suggests  important limits on  the scope  of fluctuations 
attributable to  monetary  phenomena  in  general  and  monetary policy in  partic- 
ular.  However,  these models  are not the subject of study here  because  their 
implications for the conduct of  monetary  policy in  a cyclical framework  are 
relatively speculative and  do  not fit well  within the discussion. 
Within  the class of  models  that do  give an  important role to  monetary 
policy in generating cycles,  the critical differences between  the alternative 
models  do  not involve the assumptions  about  uti  1  i  ty and  production functions. 
Instead,  the main  differences  lie  in  certain additional  constraints faced by 
agents.  Usually,  it  is  assumed  that business  cycles reflect some  failure of 
the market  economy  to  reach a Pareto-optimum.  To  explain this failure, models 
have  placed agents  under  constraints of  one  of two  types:  (1)  incomplete 
information,  of  which money  illusion can  be  considered an  extreme  special 
case,  or (2)  failure of  markets  to  clear,  of which  nonexistence of  markets  can 
be  thought of as  an  extreme  special  case.  These  constraints determine  the 
mechanism by  which  policy exerts  its  influence,  in ways  to be  explicated 
below. 
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each model  imp1  ies a set of decision rules describing how  agents  respond  to 
information available to  them.  These  decision rules imply market  demand  and 
supply  functions,  usually expressed  as  1  inear approximations,  that can  be  used 
to  relate the behavior of the aggregate  of individuals to the state of the 
economy.  It is these representations of the models--linear supply and  demand 
functions--that have  proven most  analytically tractable.'  This representa- 
tion is termed  the "structural" form of the model. 
A  serious problem inherent  in  these  representations  is  that they are 
rarely, if  ever,  invariant with respect  to the class of  policy interventions 
considered.  This point was  made  forcefully by  Lucas  (19761,  who  demonstrated 
that the orthodox  IS-LM  models  were  not invariant to changes  in  policy in  the 
presence of  rational expectations.  As a principle,  this point is uncontrover- 
sial, although its  practical implications are troubling:  either policy analy- 
si  s must  be  regarded as  impossible,  or the  sensitivity of the representation 
to  the range of policies considered must  be  assessed.  This  sensitivity 
analysis cannot  be  performed  without making explicit the microeconomic  founda- 
tions of  the model.  Recognition of this principle gave  added  vigor  to the 
ongoing search  for microeconomic  foundations. 
What  Is  Monetary Policy? 
The  very existence of  monetary  policy requires some  set of  regulations 
and/or  legal  tender restrictions affecting  the financial and  payments 
systems.  The  nature of these  regulations and  restrictions  is  a critical part 
of  the model  in  which policy choices  are made.  The  regulations and  restric- 
tions are,  however,  not well  understood  and  are taken as  fixed in the most 
common  form of policy analysis.  Sufficient assumptions  for the existence of 
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through a role as  sole provider and  (b)  simultaneously controls the rate of 
return of  base  money  relative to  other assets  through reserve requirements  and 
other controls over  the payments  system.  The  first  assumption  gives policy a 
nominal  quantity it  can  control;  the second  one  gives rise to  a demand 
function  for that quantity,  which  gives manipulation of that quantity 
conceivable leverage over the macroeconomy. 
Given  this legal and  institutional framework,  some  program of  changes  in 
the stock of  money  (or  base  money)  constitutes an  instrument  for minimizing 
the effect of the market fai  lures on  the representative private agents'  wel- 
fare.  This optimization takes  place with reference to  a1 l conceivable 
contingent behaviors for money.  These  behaviors  can  be  specified most  gen- 
erally in  terms  of  parameters of  a rule linking the quantity of  money  to the 
set of  information available to  the policymaker. 
To  formalize,  consider policy rules that are a linear function of  the 
information set.  Then  the rule may  be  written as: 
(1)  mt  =  HIt, 
where  mt  is the log of the money  stock as  of time period t, H  is  a vector of 
coefficients characterizing the policy responses,  and It  is  the information 
set available to  the policymaker  at time t. I,  might  include the "variable"  - 
1  (one)  and  any  powers  of t  (time index).  By  convention, It  excludes  mt 
itself.  Although  the latter is  observable,  it  is  already included on  the 
left-hand side--merely a kind of  normalization.  However, It  may  include 
mt-I  or other lagged money  terms,  and  generally will. 
Equation  (1)  states the obvious  truth that policymakers  can only respond 
to  the information they have  at a point in  time.  Choice of  policy is  repre- 
sented by  choice of  values of  H.  Furthermore,  choice of the elements  of  H 
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nearly a1 1  purposes,  at least in  rational expectations models,  or any  others 
displaying the neutrality of money. 
As  will be  seen,  it  is analytically useful  in  the following discussion 
to  distinguish carefully between  policy responses  to contemporaneous  informa- 
tion versus  responses  to  delayed  information.  This  distinction can  be 
effected  by  segmenting  the  information set, I,,  into current  (period-t) 
realizations and  previous  (period  t-1,  t-2, ...I  realizations.  In  particular, 
the current interest rate ought  to  be  considered  contemporaneously  observable, 
while output and  prices are known  only with a lag.  Then  the policy rule may 
be  written as: 
(2)  m,  +  qRt  =  p +  F(L)Yt-,, 
where  R  is  the nominal  interest rate,  Y  is  a vector of state variables,  q  is  a 
scalar,  and  F(L)  is an  n-dimensional  vector polynomial  in  the lag operator,  L 
(defined  such  that LkYt-I =  Y,-,-,>.  Trends  or polynomials  in t have 
been  excluded in (2) because  they only clutter the results with uninteresting 
terms.  p is treated as  an  exogenous  constant;  its value does  not bear  on 
the issues addressed.  The  pol  icy choice is then represented by  the joint 
choice of q and  F(L>.  In  each  period,  the pol  icymaker  observes  Yt-I  and,  in 
light of  Yt-,,  Yt-,,  ..., chooses  a linear sum  of  money  and  the  interest 
rate that wi  11  serve as  the criterion for money  provision in  period t. 
Rules  of form (2)  are commonly  encountered  in  the literature on  monetary 
policy,  and  are often termed money  supply  function^.^  This  function is the 
basis of  the money  supply curve  in  figure 1.  The  positive slope  there re- 
flects  a negative q,  indicating that the money  stock  is  increased  contempora- 
neously with rises in  the nominal  interest rate,  for given realizations of 
Y  - , Y ,  .  . .  .  The  intercept,  (p+F(L)Y ,-,  >/q, varies with the 
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Money Supply Function 
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F-elements might tend to  reduce the intercept in response to  output declines 
and increase it after output increases.  These two features, especially the 
cyclical  intercept, characterize what can be termed the conventional 
stabilization policy. 
What Range of  Policy Choices Is Relevant for Analysis? 
This representation of  the range of  pol  icy choices must be  simp1  ified 
careful  ly  in the context of each model  in order to proceed with analysis. 
Unfortunately, no general  procedure exists for determining an adequate, yet 
sufficiently parsimonious specification of  an optimal  policy rule under 
rational  expectations.  The appropriate specification will  depend on both the 
structure and the assumptions about information sets avai  lable to  the pol  i cy- 
maker and private agents.  This problem seems to limit analysis to  cases in 
which an adequate policy specification can be confidently determined.  In 
practice, this has meant certain restrictions on the structure and information 
sets that limit the generality of  results.  Some considerations in the choice 
of the appropriate specification are the subject of this section. 
First, the specification of the policy rule might include as arguments 
only variables in the set It  that are also in the set of  minimal  state vari- 
ables, denoted M,.  Mt  contains all  variables, treating lags as distinct 
variables, appearing explicitly in  (nonpolicy) equations of  the model  in  its 
structural form  (see  McCallum  C19831).  In models in which period t-1  vari- 
ables appear in the structural  equations, but  variables dated earlier do not, 
the minimal-state-variable criterion will  serve to  truncate F(L)  to  a vector 
of scalars.  Then equation (2) can be rewritten as: 
(3)  m,  =  p -qRt  +  FYq-,, 
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representation shall be  treated as  the appropriate representation of the 
policy rule. 
The  minimal-state-variable approach has  practical  advantages  and may 
serve  as  an  appropriate  starting point for identifying relevant variables for 
the policy rule.  Certainly,  variables in  Mt  are prime candidates for  inclu- 
sion in  the policy rule.  And  limiting those  included to  the minimal-state- 
variable set rules out an  indefinitely large number  of trivial variables, 
which analysis would  ultimately find to  be  irrelevant anyway  (their optimal 
coefficients in  the policy rule would  be  zero).  The  limitation to  minimal 
state variables is  also thought  to  rule out inclusion of intrinsically irrele- 
vant variables,  termed  bootstrap variables,  that analysis would  find relevant 
only if  they were  included in  the setup of the problem,  either in  the policy 
rule or  in  private rational expectations  formation. 
Unfortunately,  the minimal-state-variable  approach  will not neccesarily 
result in  an  adequate  policy rule.  Ambiguities about  which variables are 
relevant generally arise unless particular assumptlons  are made  concerning 
private agents'  information sets,  denoted  St.  Mt  may  not contain all the 
variables providing relevant conditioning information that agents  use  to  form 
rational expectations.  Hence,  some  variables not in {Mtn It)  may  be 
relevant state variables after all and  should appear  in  the representation of 
the policy rule.  For  example,  prices  in  the last period may  not appear  in  the 
"structural" form of the model  (supply  and  demand  equations);  yet, if  private 
agents  forming expectations  have  an  information set containing only lagged 
prices,  then those prices will generally influence supply and  demand  decisions 
via expectations,  and  should appear  in the optimal  policy rule.  But if,  on 
the other hand,  private agents  were  endowed  with a different information  set, 
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tive.  Then  lagged prices might not be  a relevant state variable and  need  not 
appear  in  the policy rule.  The  importance of  this example  is  that,  regardless 
of the specification of St,  lagged prices are not a minimal  state variable, 
because  the latter depends  only on  the structural  equations,  not on  St. 
Yet,  a change  in  St  affects the relevant set of  variables that generally 
appear  in  the optimal  policy rule.  Hence,  inclusion of  all minimal  state 
variables does  not assure a sufficient representation for an  optimal  rule. 
All told,  parsimony  in  the setup of the optimization problem,  and 
particularly the variables included in the policy rule,  is  both essential  and 
fraught  with dangers.  Chief among  these  dangers  is  that relevant variables 
(including various lags)  may  inadvertently be  left out of the policy rule. 
Yet,  unless  the analyst is sure  that (at least)  all the relevant variables are 
included,  the form of the rule postulated may  exclude  the optimal  policy or 
policies altogether.  Then,  the optimal  policy or policies are ruled out in 
the setup of the analysis.  Or,  an  unduly  restricted policy space  may  include 
only some  6f the members  of  the class of  optimal  policies,  but not all.  Then, 
feasible policies with very different characteristics may  be  just as  desirable 
as  the best within the restricted policy space,  yet the analyst might incor- 
rectly argue  against  them on the basis of his limited results. 
Hypothetical  illustrations of the problems  attending undue  restriction 
of  the policy space  are conveyed  by  figure 2  for two different economic 
models.  For  simplicity,  the appropriate  specification of  the policy rule is 
assumed  to  be 
(4)  m,  =  -qRt  +  fyt-, , 
where  y  is  output.  The  unrestricted pol  icy space  is  qxf, or R
2. 
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The Policy Space 
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optimum  is (q*  lf=O)  or (f*  lq=O),  respectively.  Wi  thout these undue 
restrictions,  the optimal  policy set is the line MM  in  the model  corresponding 
to the upper  panel,  and  the point M  in  that of the  lower panel.  In  the first 
case,  partial analysis  leads  to  an  optimum;  but the analyst might,  on  the 
basis of  his results,  argue  fa1  laciously against other optimal  policies that 
had  either q or f negative.  In the  second  case,  partial analysis does  not 
arrive at a global optimum,  or even  a correct evaluation of the  signs of  op- 
timal policy parameters.  Problems  of both kinds can  easily occur.  Formal 
examples  of the first  kind will be  given in  what  follows.  The  second  type of 
problem was  informally illustrated above;  it  is likely to  arise without par- 
ticular restrictions on  information and  the structure.  These  problems  are a 
major,  if inadequately  acknowledged,  pi  tfall of analysis of optimal policy 
under  rational expectations.  Often,  analysis has  avoided  thi  s problem only by 
somewhat  arbitrary restrictions on  information  sets I, andlor  St. 
Another,  valid,  restriction on  the relevant policy space  is  that which 
rules out indeterminacy of important variables.  The  values  of q and  F  of  the 
policy rule specified by  the general  form (3)  cannot  be  specified  arbitrarily, 
for  (3) must  suffice to  complete  the economic  model  in the sense  of rendering 
a1 1 the endogenous  variables  determinate.  The  force of this restriction 
obviously depends  on  the other aspects  of the model.  An  important example  to 
be  given relates to indeterminacy of  money  and  prices under  a "pol  icy" of 
pegging  the  interest rate. 
Throughout  the formal  analysis  that follows,  it  will be  further assumed 
that q  and  F  are not functions of time.'  This assumption  implies  that the 
pol  icymaker  is  able to  make  a commi tment  to  a time-consi  stent rule of  beha- 
vior.  Under  rational expectations,  the ability to so  commit  is necessary  to 
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en1  ist  the  support of private expectations.  This assumption  is  far from 
innocuous  and  its  realism is  doubtful.  A  new  and  growing  literature attempts 
to  deal  with the design of second-best policies in  models  in  which  the policy- 
maker i  s  constrained by  an i  nabi 1 i  ty to  precommi t.  (See,  for example,  Barro 
C19861).  Nevertheless,  even if the first-best policy is infeasible,  the 
macroeconomic  issues  involved in  its  design  will still be  relevant. 
The  analysis  to  follow will  restrict attention to  steady-state proper- 
ties of a1  ternative stochastic model s,  because  only these properties are 
determined by  rational expectations models.  For  a given model  and  a given 
objective function,  there is a mapping  from each  element  in  the policy space 
to  the value of the objective function.  The  optimal policy is  characterized 
by  the element  (or,  if  nonunique,  set of elements)  in the policy space  associ- 
ated with the optimization of the objective function.  This policy will serve 
to  minimize  the effectiveness of,  or utility loss pursuant  to,  the constraints 
on  information or market-cleari  ng  that prevent the economy  from attaining a 
Pareto-optimal  allocation of resources.  In the following analysis,  the  varia- 
tions in  the constraints on  private utility  maximization  that differentiate 
prominent macroeconomic  models  are shown  to  imply variations in  the optimal 
pol  icy rule. 
Pre-Rational-Expectations  IS-LM  Models 
For  a number  of  related reasons,  it  is useful  toqtbegin  analysis with 
pre-rational-expectations IS-LM models.  First,  they have  pedagogical  value  in 
that their analytical  simp1 ici  ty sets  the  stage  for easier  understanding  of 
more  complex  models.  Second,  these IS-LM models  generate most  conventional 
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macroeconometric  models.  An  assessment  of the shortcomings  of  these  pre- 
rational IS-LM  models  helps motivate the assumption of rational expectations. 
Finally,  understanding how  optimal  policy is designed  in  pre-rational models 
will allow insight-provoking contrasts with the rational expectat.ions models. 
The  Fi  xed-Pri  ce  Model 
In the influential treatment of  monetary policy of Poole  (19701,  the 
model  was  of the simple  textbook IS-LM  form,  with fixed,  or at least exoge- 
nous,  prices.  The  aggregate  commodity  demand  function,  or IS  curve,  was 
(5)  yt =  do  +  dtRt  +  dzyt-1 +  ~lt,  dI<O<dz<l, 
where  y was  output,  and  the money  demand  or LM  curve  was 
(6)  m,  =  a.  +  a,Rt  +  a,yt  +  et,  al<O<a,. 
ut and  et  were  disturbances.  Output  was  determined  strictly by  demand: 
(7)  y,  =  y:. 
Generally,  if, as  in this case,  there are no  expectations  in  a model, 
the policy rule need  include,  at most,  the minimal  set of state variables  that 
are also in  the policymakers'  information set.  The  minimal  set includes  yt, 
yt-,,  R,,  and  m,,  but yt is  not contemporaneously  observable  to the 
policymaker.  Therefore,  an  optimal  policy will take the form: 
(8)  m,  =  PO - qRt  + 
where  q  and f  are  scalars.  Since output is determined  strictly by  demand, 
reflecting the fixed-price assumption,  and  since  the utility function embodies 
risk aversion,  the appropriate  criterion is  minimization of deviations of out- 
put around  its  optimal  level,  where  the latter depends  on  implicit and  fixed 
productivity and  tastes.  An  appropriate value  of p is needed  to  make 
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average  level of  output depends  on  the average  level of  money.  (Obviously, 
this is a particularly crude  violation of the natural rate property.)  Then, 
using a quadratic local approximation for the utility function,  the appropri- 
ate objective is the minimization of  output variance around  this optimal 
output average.  The  optimization problem  is thus  separable  into a level and  a 
variance problem,  and  the latter wi  11  occupy  the following discussion. 
Then  the optimization can  be  represented as  that of  minimizing the vari- 
ance  of output with respect to (q,fl),  subject  to  equations  (51, (61, and 
(7). 
The  reduced form solution for output  is 
(9)  yt =  dl(p-ao)Jt  +  (ald2+q+dlfl>Jlyt-l  +  (al+q)Jlut  - dlJlet, 
where  Jl =  (al+a2dl+q>-' 
with a steady-state variance of 
(10)  =  C(a,+q)'  0:)  +  d:  0% I  J2, 
where  oG=  E(yt-Ey  ) ', 
2  UI=  E(u~  t-Eu1 t)', 
o:=  E(et-Eet>',  and 
J2  =  (al  +  a2d1)' -  (ald2  +  df1I2  +  2q(al+a2dl-ald2-dlfl>2. 
The  policy space  qxfl is  R
2  excluding q =  -al-a2dl.  Assuming  the 
disturbances  are uncorrelated,  the first-order conditions  imply the optimal  q 
and fl are given by 
(11)  q =  (d,/a2>(o~/o:>  - al 
and 
(12)  fl  =  -aldz/dI  +  q/dl. 
These  expressions  show  that the static IS-LM model  supports  conventional 
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negative if, as  commonly  supposed,  the variance of  money  demand  disturbances 
is "large" (in a loose  sense  that depends  on  dl/az  and  al) relative to 
commodity  demand  disturbances.  Then  money  supply  should be  positively related 
to  the current interest rate (given yt-l).  The  value of fl will be  nega- 
tive,  implying that countercyclical  variations in  money  help stabilize output. 
It is noteworthy,  for comparisons  with later models,  that the optimal  q and 
fl  are unique.  Also,  the choice of  q (contemporaneous  responses)  is  separ- 
able from the choice of f, (lagged  responses),  in  the  sense  that the optimal 
choice of  q can  be  found without considering the optimal  value of f,  .  The 
optimal  choice of  q is  also unaffected  by  the magnitude of  d2,  the coeffi- 
cient linking commodity  demand  to  its past.  In  other words,  the dynamics  of 
this model  are  such  that they do  not become  a consideration in the choice of 
the slope of the money  supply function depicted in  figure 1,  but only in  the 
choice of its state-dependent  intercept. 
One  of the most  glaring shortcomings of  the static IS-LM  model  is that 
it  1  eaves  prices undetermined,  or exogenous.  One  s  imp1  e,  and  conventional , 
means  of  making prices endogenous  is  to  introduce the "law of supply and 
demand, " 
(13)  pt =  pt-1 +  ~(yt-yc), v>O, 
under  which  inflation varies directly with "demand  pressure,"  equal  to  real 
demand,  y,,  minus  "full employment" or "capacity" output,  y
c.  This 
alteration invites placement of p,  in  the money  demand  function, 
(14)  m,  - pt =  a.  +  alR,  +  azyt +  et,  al<O<az. 
However,  this method of  making  the price level endogenous  has  severe 
problems.  If neither buyers  nor  sellers can  be  forced to  transact,  then  the 
demand-determination of  output implies that prices must  be  too high to  clear 
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additional  explanation of supply behavior  is  required.  Suppliers must  either 
face  money  illusion or  be  under  some  type of non-price rationing constraint, 
or prices and  the interest rate would  fall immediately  to  the level  that would 
clear the commodity  market  and  output would  be  constrained by  supply,  rather 
than by  demand.  Even  with rationing or money  illusion,  prices will fall per- 
sistently over  time,  as  long as  aggregate  demand  is the constraint on output. 
The  optimal  policy would  seem  to  be  an  increase in  the money  stock adequate  to 
force  interest rates down  low  enough  and  drive output up  to  its supply con- 
straint,  at which  time deflation would  halt.  It is interesting to  note  that 
there is no  trade-off between maintaining full employment  and  stabilizing the 
price level  in  this model.  Falling prices invariably reflect less-than- 
capacity output levels.  It is a1  so  noteworthy that aggregate  demand  is  mi  s- 
specified in this model,  and  ought  to  have  the real rate of interest rather 
than  the nominal  rate as  its argument,  unless  expectations of inflation 
(actually,  deflation1 are fixed.  This problem can  be  resolved only by  intro- 
ducing price-level expectations. 
The  Adaptive Expectations Model 
An  explicit commodity  supply function,  together  with some  mechanism  for 
reconciling demand  and  supply--either by market-clearing price and  interest- 
rate adjustments,  or by  some  rationale for price stickiness other than ration- 
ing of demand  among  suppliers--seemed necessary elements  for macroeconomic 
models  with desirable microeconomic  (and  empirical) implications.  The  first 
major attempt,  attributable to Phelps  (19671,  Friedman (19681,  and  Lucas  and 
Rapping  (19691,  relied on  workers'  confusions  between  real and  nominal  wages 
which  were  exploited by  employers.  Wages  were  slow  to  adjust to  actual 
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informed about  the price level.  Thus,  they were  tricked into working harder, 
at lower  actual real wages,  whenever  the price level rose relative to previous 
expectations.  This notion is incorporated in  the following dynamic  version of 
the IS-LM  model,  in  which  expectations adapt slowly and mechanistically. 
In  the IS-LM  model  with autoregressive  expectations,  pt appears  in  the 
money  demand  function,  as  in  (14).  The  aggregate demand  function becomes 
(15)  yt =  do +  dirt +  dzyt-I  +  u1  t,  dl<O<dz<l, 
where 
(16)  rt  =  Rt-Et(pt+l-pt) 
and  the aggregate  supply  function  becomes 
(17)  yz  =  so +  Xyt-1  +  ~(pt  -  Etpt) +  uzt,  s>O,  O<X<l. 
The  lagged output term,  yt-,,  in (17)  can  represent  capacity effects of 
previous output levels,  or costs of  adjustment  in  employment  levels,  as  in 
Sargent  (1979).  To  (15)  and  (17)  is  added  a market-clearing equation 
(18)  y:  =  yt 
and  expectations equations of the adaptive  type,  such  as 
(19)  Etpt =  +o++Pt-r 
and  Etpt+, =  +o(l-+)++2pt-1,  0<+<1. 
According  to  (191,  agents  predict prices according to  a first-order autore- 
gression.  It is  noteworthy,  for later comparisons,  that price expectations 
are  backward-looking:  they are uniquely determined at time t by  the initial 
condition pt-,. 
In  general,  an  adequate yet parsimonious  representation of  an  optimal 
policy rule is  easy  to  determine  in  models  with ad  hoc  expectations forma- 
tions.  An  adequate  policy rule need  include only those  variables  in  the 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copypol  1 cymaker's  information set that are either minimal  state variables or vari- 
ables upon which private expectations are conditioned.  pt-I  is the only 
expectations-condi  tioning variable, according to (18)  and  (19).  So  the rule 
should include m,,  Rt,  Y,-~,  and  P,-~: 
(20)  mt  =  p-qRt +  fl~t-~  +  fzpt-l. 
Many economists initially treated output stabilization as the appropri- 
ate criterion for policy in  this model.  That criterion is inappropriate, as 
will  be argued later, when the microeconomics of  the supply function are 
considered.  Nevertheless, to understand the implications for theory and 
policy of  rational  expectations--as distinct from the advances in micro- 
economic foundations of  supply behavior that occurred more or less concomit- 
antly--it is useful  to consider how policies might be designed to control 
output in  the adaptive expectations model. 
The reduced-form equation for output is 
(21)  y,  =  no+n,~,-l+n2p,-l+n,~1t+n4~2t+n5et 






and  n5=-sdJ, 
where 
J=[dl+s(q+al+a2dl  )I-'. 
In this model, the relevant policy space includes all  combinations of 
(q,f,,f,)  except those for which q=-dl/s-a,-a2dl,  because the latter would 
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ance  is specified by: 
(22)  q =  (dlo~+s2o~)/(l+a2s)sd-at, 
(23)  f  ,=-s-'C~-d~(l+a~s)l-d~s-'d;'J-~, 
and 
(24)  f,=  ~C1+(~-l)(dl/s)(l-azs+J-l)l. 
Somewhat  surprisingly,  the  signs of the optimal  values of f  and  f2 
are ambiguous,  without extensive empirical  information.  However,  a counter- 
cyclical policy,  by  which  is  meant  nonzero  F=Efl  f,l,  can  obviously be 
effective in  this model.  Indeed,  the business  cycle--characterized by  persis- 
tent high and  low  values of  output relative to trend--can be  eliminated,  given 
complete  knowledge  of the  structural parameters.  The  minimization of output 
variations (corresponding to  these  choices  of q,  fl, and f,)  is  consistent 
with this elimination of the business  cycle.  So,  the properly designed  policy 
wi  11 both  make  output innovations  (stochastic  fluctuations not attributable to 
tendencies of  previous  such  fluctuations to persist)  as  small  as  possible 
eliminate any  tendency  toward persistence.  That  these  two properties  are 
found  simultaneously  in  the optimal  rule for this--and other pre-rational- 
expectations models--may  seem  trivial.  However,  this coincidence  is not a 
general  feature of rational expectations model s. 
As  in  the  static IS-LM  model,  the optimal  choice of q can  be  determined 
without reference to the choice of  fr  and f,.  Also like the  static IS-LM 
model,  the output-variance-minimizing value of q is  independent  of  the 
dynamics  of the model  (d,,  4,  fl, and f,  do  not appear  in  equation  (22)  ), 
while F  depends  on  both the dynamic  elements  (d,  and  $1  as  well as  q. 
It  is  noteworthy  that conventional  macroeconometric  models  are essen- 
tial  ly  an  admixture of the static and  dynamic  IS-LM  models  described in  this 
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model  with autoregressive expectations (see  McCallum C19801  and the references 
cited there).  Instead of  suppliers' prices responding to adapting price 
expectations, though, price behavior is described as responding to labor and 
product market conditions.  This difference in  description is essentially 
inconsequential for the qua1  i tative analysis of optimal  pol  icy.  However, the 
aggregate demand specification of  conventional  models is that of the static 
model , with the nominal rather than the real  interest rate as an argument. 
This latter difference is consequential. 
The IS-LM model  with autoregressive expectations and an expectational 
Phi  11  ips curve seemed, initially, to satisfy objections to  the earlier simple 
IS-LM model.  Prices are no longer exogenous, but respond to  the same set of 
shocks as does output.  If et  and  U,  have variances that are "large" 
relative to  that of  uzt  (in  a loose sense that depends upon the structural 
parameters dl  , s,  a,  , a2,  q, and $1,  then output and prices wi 11 be 
positively correlated.  Yet, an occasionally "large" supply shock Unt could 
result in coincidence of high inflation and low output.  These features gave 
the model  greater empirical  credibility than the earlier IS-LM models in  which 
supply behavior was not made explicit. 
Yet, despite these improvements, the IS-LM  model with autoregressive 
expectations retained one fatally implausible microeconomic implication:  it 
was inconsistent with the natural  rate hypothesis.  In the representation 
shown above, in which price-level  expectations are stationary, any regular 
increase in the money stock would bring about a permanent increase in output. 
In the more popular "accelerationist"  representation, price-level  expectations 
are stationary in growth rates.  In these, a regular increase in the growth 
rate of money would  bring about a permanent increase in output.  If  auto- 
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then specification of  a policy rule of (d+l)th-order  stationarity will be  suf- 
ficient to  make  the model  inconsistent with the natural rate hypothesis. 
This  inconsistency arises because  policy can  render  expectations biased.  To 
eliminate this inconsistency,  economists have  found it  necessary  to  adopt  the 
assumption of  rational expectations. 
The  IS-LM  Model  with Rational  Expectations 
The  fundamental  policy insight of rational  expectations is that,  to  the 
extent policy effects depend  on  expectational  errors,  they cannot  be  syste- 
matic.  This  proposition follows,  in  large part,  from the expectational 
Phillips curve,  or supply function (171,  under  which output  is  entirely 
inelastic with respect to  expected  inflation.  Therefore,  a supposedly 
countercyclical  policy of,  for example,  increasing money  growth  when  a reces- 
sion is  observed,  will  not be  effective in  stabilizing output because  sellers 
will fully anticipate the  implied variations in  prices.  This proposition was 
frequently described as  "policy ineffectiveness,"  seeming  to  suggest  that 
choice of any  one  policy rule is as  good  as  another  (at least within the class 
of rules serving to  complete  the model).  However,  careful  analysis below  will 
show  that the relevance or irrelevance of  Q  and  F depends  on  particular 
assumptions  about  information availability or endowments.  The  resulting 
ambiguities are largely a resu1.t of  problems  related to  the aggregate  demand 
function. 
Rational  expectations,  in their strong Muthian form,  are  those  generated 
by  using the  information available and  in  full  knowledge  of the model,  includ- 
ing the money  supply rule.  Formally,  rational  expectations of current and 
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(25)  Etpt+l =  ECP~+~  (St],  i=1,2, 
where  the  symbol  E  denotes  the (true)  mathematical  expectation derived within 
the model  and  St  is the information set conditioning expectations at time 
t.  The  rational expectations  assumption  prevents any  systematic  errors in 
price expectations.  In  particular, it  replaces  the autoregressive expecta- 
tions mechanism of the previous  section with a mechanism  that is  explicitly 
dependent  on  the  structure,  inclwding the policy rule.  This ensures  that the 
effects of contemplated  changes  in  the policy rule do not rely on  exploitation 
of systemati  c expectational  errors. 
Sargent  and  Wallace  (1975)  demonstrated  that replacement of autoregres- 
sive with rational expectations  in the IS-LM  model  described above  implied two 
radical  implications about  the optimal  policy rule:  (1)  that the values of 
fl and f2  were  irrelevant for output variance,  and  (2)  that prices and  the 
money  stock were  indeterminate  under  a pure "interest rate rule." 
To  show  the first  proposition,  consider  that reduced-form solutions for 
pt (expressions  for the latter are functions,  necessarily linear,  of the 
state variables,  or predetermined and  exogenous  variables entering model 
equations)  must  take  the  trial solution form: 
(26)  Yt=n10+~llyt-1+r12~t-1+n~~~~~+n~~~~~+~~~e~ 
and  pt=nz0+n2  1yt-l+n22pt-l+~l  t+fi24u2  t+n25et 
for some  nl,s,  where  the  latter are functions of parameters  of the 
model.  The  complete  reduced-form solutions for a1 1 endogenous  variables 
can  be  obtained by  assigning them  trial solution forms,  substituting them  into 
model  equations,  and  solving the  implied identities for the  rl,s.  Ration- 
al expectations are  imposed  by  applying  (25) to (26).  In this application, 
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lagged realizations of variables, 
(27) St={pt-1 ,yt-1,.  . .). 
Agents were ignorant of u1  t,  uZt,  and et,  which for simplicity are 
assumed here to be  nonautocorrelated and independent. 
(28) Etul  t=Etu2  t=Etet=Eu  tu2  t=Eu2  tet=Eul  tet=O. 
Then,  (25) through  (28) imply 
(29) Etpt  =  r~~+w~lYt-l+w~~Pt-l 
2  and  Etpt+l=(rl  o+wl  lw20+w1  o)+nl (w21+w1  I~ZZ+~I  2)pt-1. 
It is by  the derivation of the expectations expressions in  (291, and their use 
in  the trial  solution, that rationality of expectations is  imposed on the 
model . 
The supply function (17) and the trial  solutions (26) and  (29) imply 
(30) yt=so+~yt-l+sw13ult+(l+sw14~~2t+srlset. 
yt-l  appears in  this expression with the fixed coefficient X, and pt-l  does 
not appear at a1  1 , hence, f  and f,  do not  i nf  1 uence aytlayt  -  or 
ayt/apt-,. The partial  derivatives 
(31  ayt/au1 =sw13  =n3=s(al+q>J, 
aytiauZt  =1+~~14  =nq=dJ, 
and  ayt/aet =swls  =ns=-sdJ, 
turn out to be  identical  to those for the version with autoregressive expecta- 
tions, shown in equation (21). 
Two implications for (q,fl,f,>  of these results are immediate. 
First, the optimal  fl  and f,  are nonunique; indeed, those parameters are 
irrelevant for output, as claimed  by the first proposition of  Sargent and 
Wallace.  Second, the output-variance-minimizing value of  q is the unique 
value given by  (22),  and has the properties attributed to it  there, including 
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(q,fl,f2)  are entirely unaffected  by  additional  dynamic  elements,  such  as 
the introduction of additional  lagged  terms or autocorrelations of error terms 
in  the model's  equations. 
In this model,  even  nonmonetary  influences on  aggregate  demand  that can 
be  forecast by  agents  in  advance  of their occurrence  are impotent,  being neu- 
tralized via changes  in  prices.  For  example,  fiscal policy that operates 
through  the mechanism of changing aggregate demand  (as  part of ult> is 
irrelevant for  output if announced  in  advance  (regardless  of the monetary  pol- 
icy rule adopted).  In  IS-LM  type model s,  only unexpected monetary  or fiscal 
policies matter  for output,  aside from the automatic  stabilizers inherent in 
graduated-rate tax systems,  in  the case  of fiscal policies,  and  the choice of 
q,  in  the case  of  monetary policies.' 
"Interest Rate  Rules" 
The  second  major  result in  Sargent  and  Wallace's model  is that an 
"interest rate rule" does  not serve  to complete  the model  in  that it  leaves 
prices and  money  indeterminate.  This result will require a modified  analysis 
to  derive,  because  such  "rules" are not representable in  the policy space 
(q,fl ,f,> in  R
3.  Consider  the "rules" of form: 
(32)  Rt=go+giyt-~+gzpt-~. 
(The  indeterminacy result would also occur  in  any  generalization of (32) in 
which  mt  is lacking).  (32)  does  not specify corresponding  elements  in  the 
(q,fl ,f,)  space,  because  there is  no  unique  transformat'ion  from 
(gO,gl  ,g2)  into (q,fl  ,f2).  Therefore,  the solutions  for endogenous 
variables under  the money  supply rule (20)  cannot  be  used  to  determine  out- 
comes  under  (32). ' 
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ables,  it  is  worth noting that a kind of  policy irrelevance continues  to hold 
true.  In  fact,  output under  (32)  would  be 
(33)  yt =  so+Xyt-t+su1t 
(which  happens  to  coincide with the  limit  of  expression  (30)  as  q approaches 
infinity),  an  expression devoid of the gis. 
To  show  that pt and  mt  are indeterminate  in this case,  it simplifies 
matters  to notice first that the money  demand  equation,  (141,  does  not,  in 
view of (321,  help determine  pt.  It  only determines  mt if  pt is deter- 
mined  by  the other equations of  the model.  So  (14)  need  not be  part of the 
analysis of determinateness of  prices if the  specification of  "policy" is 
(32). 
Now  the determinacy of  prices could be  established by  demonstrating that 
the trial solution of  (26)  for pt is unique;  that is,  that the w2,s are 
finite and  unique.  The  restrictions on  the rzls  implied by  the model  can 
be  inferred in the fol  lowing way.  Equating y:,  (1  51, and  y:,  (17),  and 
using (321, 
(34)  spt  =  (do+dgo-~o)+dglyt-1+(d2-X>Yt-t+(~r  t-~zt)-dEtpt+l+(d+~)Etpt. 
Then,  substitution of (26>,  (291,  and  (33)  into (34)  implies  the following 
identi  ties: 
(35)  sw20=(do+dlgo-so)-dI (n20(1+n22)+s0~2  1)+(d1+s)w20 
sn2  l=(d1gl+d2-X>-dl~2  1 (X+'~122)+(d1+~)~1, 
SW~  4=-1 
sd2  5=0 
These  identities obviously provide unique  values  for nz3,  wz4,  and r25.9 
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distinct values.  This nonuniqueness  is  contagious because  the solution 
values  for rzO  and r2  depend  on nz2  .  Hence,  it  is already clear that the 
model  with (32)  does  not place sufficient restrictions on the n,,s  to  provide 
determinacy.  (However,  the solution for output remains  uniquely determinate. 1 
To  simplify further study of the identities in  (351,  consider  the 
restriction of g2, which  appears  in  the third identity,  to  zero.  This 
restriction is,  in  view of (331,  irrelevant for output.  Under  the minimal- 
state-variable approach,  this restriction would  be  imposed  by  eliminating 
pt-l  from the trial solution,  so  that nZ2=0, by  assumption.  Then  the 
"solution" for prices is 
(36)  ~~=(~)+(do+dlgo-~o)~0~d7~yt-l+~-'ul  ~-s-'uZ~, 
where  the  (m)  symbol  indicates that the intercept rzO  is undefined. 
This  indefinite intercept indicates pt is indeterminate. 
On  the other hand,  if the minimal-state-variable set is augmented  by 
inclusion of pt-,,  n.,,  can  take on  the values  of  zero or unity.  In  the 
former  case,  (36)  is  again  the solution.  If  IT^^=^,  then the solution is 
(37) pt=E(do-so)+dl  (go-sogl )-~(d2-x)3(2+2dl)-' 
+Cgl+(d2-X>d;'lyt-i+~t-i+~-~~l  t-s-luzt. 
This  solution,  having  i3pt/i3pt-l=l,  implies a time  series for pt that is 
stationary only in  first  differences.  Nevertheless,  this solution is  deter- 
mi  nate. 
McCallum  (1986)  shows  that a reduced form for Rt  specified  by  (32)  can 
result from two different money  supply rules,  one  which  is stationary in  mt, 
as  in  (201,  and  one  which  is stationary only in  first  differences,  as if  mt, 
the  l eft-hand-side variable in (20),  were  prefixed by  the difference  operator 
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number  of  money  supply  rules,  in  higher order differences of  money,  that would 
make  Rt  behave  as  specified by  (321,  as  the bootstrap variables pt-I, 
pt-*,  P~-~,.  .  . are allowed to  enter the solution.  Consequently,  as  noted 
at the start of this section,  "interest rate rules" do not adequately  specify 
the policy rule and  hence  fail to  complete  the model. 
In summary,  either there is  no  determinate  solution for prices,  as  when 
bootstraps  are ruled out,  or there are an  indefinitely large number  of  multi- 
ple solutions,  including one  in  which  the  intercept is  indeterminate.  It is 
hard,  indeed,  to  regard these  two possibilities as  meaningfully  distinct.  Any 
behavior of  prices can  be  consistent with the model  under  "policy rule" (32) 
and  rational expectations. 
Analytical Problems  Under  Alternative Information Constraints 
Money  supply rules,  except  in  pathological  cases,  leave  a1 1  variables 
determinate.  But,  for analytical reasons,  characterization of an  optimal  rule 
or set of  rules is  difficult or impossible except in  a very restrictive class 
of  models,  of which  the Sargent  and  Wallace model  is  an  example.  The  assump- 
tions about  information  constraints on  private agents  made  policy implications 
easy  to  derive in  that model.  Alternative information structures  in which 
private agents  observe  current realizations of  variables,  such  as  Rt,  in 
forming  the expectations of  the current and  future price level,  can  lead to 
surprising implications for the optimal  policy rule. 
This point is neatly illustrated by an  insightful analysis by Canzoneri, 
Henderson,  and  Rogoff  (1983).  First,  they  simp1  ify  the structural form of the 
Sargent  and  Wal lace model  by dropping terms  in  yt  -, from both commodity 
supply and  demand  functions,  and  eliminating supply shocks  (uzt=O for a11  t). 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copyThen  they consider  a1  ternati  ve  assumptions  about  private-agent use of the nom- 
i  nal  interest rate.  If the expectation of the current price level,  present  in 
the supply function,  is  conditioned on 
(38)  St"  =  {  Rt,  a1 1 lagged realizations of state variables), 
then the policy rule is irrelevant for output.  In  this case,  even  the optimal 
q i  s indeterminate!  In  essence,  suppl  iers,  whose  behavior  could be  systemati- 
cally influenced  by policy only because  of contemporaneous  policy responses  to 
the interest rate,  are able to  estimate  such  responses  by  looking at the 
interest rate,  and  the market  will therefore adjust prices to  neutralize them 
after all. 
An  alternative information specification assumes  that expectations of 
the rate of inflation, present in  the demand  function,  are made  with knowledge 
of  the current interest rate: 
(39)  Et(pt+l-pt)  =  EC(pt+l-pt) lS:+'I. 
In this case,  tractability requires further ad  hoc  and  unmotivated  restric- 
tions on  the pol  icy space.  In  the examples  explored by Canzoneri , Henderson, 
and  Rogoff,  either q or F  is  restricted to  zero or a zero vector,  respec- 
tively.  If F-0  is imposed,  as  in  the policy rule 
(40)  mt=  p - qRt, 
then the expression for the optimal  q  is the same  as  for the Poole model, 
given in  equation  (11).  The  other example  they explore considers  policy rules 
of the form 
(41)  mt=  p +  f,mt-l  +  f4Rt-l. 
In  the latter case,  Canzoneri,  Henderson,  and  Rogoff  show  that, if  f3  is 
restricted to  unity,  the optimal f,  is 
(42)  f4=l+Cal (l+a2s)/alslC~~/~~l, 
whose  sign cannot  be  determined without further knowledge  about  parameters  and 
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Interestingly,  the behavior of  output is  the same  in  these  cases: 
either with (40)  and (ll),  or with (411,  f,=l,  and  (42).  The  resulting 
output variance  is  probably  the lowest attainable,  but other pol  icy rules 
without these  values of q  and  F  are also likely to  result in  the  same  vari- 
ance.  This case  is  reminiscent of the upper  panel  of figure 2. 
This example  shows  that the optimal  policy rule may  not be  unique,  and 
that this characteristic may  not always  be  easy  to  discover,  unless  the ana- 
lyst is  willing to try  out many  different representations,  some  of  which may 
not be  obvious  or intuitive.  The  restriction f,=l  or f3=0  has  commonly 
been  necessary  to impose  even  in  very  simple models,  with few behavioral  para- 
meters and  disturbances.  lo  And  if the supply  shock,  uZt, is  reintroduced 
and  autocorrelation in  various shocks  or lagged output terms  are allowed  in 
structural equations,  the optimal  values of  q  and  F  become  hopelessly ambigu- 
ous.  Even  their relevance or irrelevance and  optimal  signs  will depend  on  too 
many  particulars. 
Although ambiguities concerning policy effectivness arise from generali- 
zations of the Sargent and  Wallace model,  it  was  important  in dramatically 
demonstrating that rational  expectations,  whose  imposition was  required to 
make  the conventional  IS-LM models  consistent with the natural rate property, 
had  quite radical  implications for those models,  rather than representing a 
technical  advance  those models  might or might not usefully incorporate.  In 
particular,  previous demonstrations  that conventional  policies could stabilize 
output were  found dependent  on  implausible exploitation of biased expecta- 
tions. 
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Market  clearing is the equation of commodity  demand  and  supply via 
adjustments  in  prices and  interest rates.  This assumption has  been  at the 
heart of  most  microeconomic  theory,  and might be  considered the natural mecha- 
nism by  which  supply and  demand  are reconciled.  But  price changes  are only 
one  conceivable means  of reconciling quantities demanded  and  supplied.  Many 
economists  see  the economy  as  laboring under  constraints that can  be  usefully 
described as  constraints on  adjustments of  prices.  As  this constraint is 
imposed  on  the model , potenti  a1  (notional  demanders  and  suppl i  ers are frus- 
trated,  unable  to  make  transactions they both desire at mutually agreeable 
prices,  because  transactions at these  prices are ruled out.  This frustration 
can  be  quite persistent,  if  price adjustments  are slow,  causing persistent 
output fluctuations. 
This constraint cannot  be  taken  literally.  It is intended only as  a 
useful  representation of some  hard-to-specify problems.  It is  not necessarily 
that agents  are  somehow  forced to transact only at sticky prices or to  sign 
contracts because  of constraints other than  those  arising from technology  or 
tastes.  It  is,  instead,  that aspects  of technology or tastes  are not ade- 
quately captured  by  neoclassical  production and  uti  l  i  ty functions.  Then, 
sticky prices or contracts may  help,  or reflect attempts  by,  agents  to  opti- 
mize.  For  exampl'e,  nominal  contracting may  reflect "technological" difficul- 
ties in  developing credible Pareto-optimal  agreements  arising from some  kind 
of information,  monitoring,  enforcement,  or coordination problems.  Further 
work  into the microfoundations of "sticky prices" may  succeed  in  replacing 
price adjustment or contracting "constraints" with a more  satisfactory 
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show  that the true constraints are poorly represented by  present  sticky-price 
macroeconomic  models.  Hence,  any  practical policy conclusions  of  present 
models  should be  regarded as  speculative.  Also,  the irony of  treating such 
phenomena  as  voluntary contracts as  a "constraint" preventing,  rather than 
aiding,  optimization should be  noted. 
Proceeding on  the more  superficial or descriptive level,  recent work on 
non-market-clearing models  has  incorporated rational expectations and  imposed 
a tendency  of  prices  to  adjust to  market-clearing levels,  albeit slowly. 
These  two features have  made  them  consistent with the natural  rate property. 
Consequently,  that policy responses  to  the  state of  the economy  can  sometimes 
be  effective  in  these models  is interesting,  and  they  seem  to  provide a poten- 
tial  ly  pursuasi  ve  negation of the first  proposi tion of Sargent  and  Wall ace. 
Of  course,  the relevance of this negation depends  on  whether  markets 
actual  ly  clear.  Rational  expectations models  with incomplete  information have 
altered economists
1  views  concerning  the plausibility of the market-clearing 
assumption.  Failure of  markets  to  clear had  often been  considered apparent 
from the  slow movements  and/or  discontinuity of individual prices.  However, 
incomplete  information among  buyers  and  sellers can  lead to  slowly moving 
prices under  market-clearing,  or to  changes  at discrete intervals when  new 
information is  received.  Skepticism regarding market-clearing had  also arisen 
from  the persistence of  above- or below-average  measured  unemployment  rates. 
Then  again,  it  is  not obvious  that such  phenomena  reflect failure of  wages  to 
adjust to  clear "the" labor market.  Labor  immobi 1  i  ty and  interindustry  labor 
demand  shifts can  combine  to  create such  fluctuations,  even if wages  are not 
sticky.  And,  again,  some  cyclical behavior  of unemployment  could be  observed 
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short,  it  is  difficult  or impossible  to  determine  empirically whether  observed 
price behavior reflects  non-market-clearing.  The  issue may  be  purely meta- 
physical. 
Yet,  consider  the view  that the markets  do  not clear.  The  implications 
for  pol  icy cannot be  discovered without specifying the nonprice elements  of 
the mechanism  by  which  the reconciliation between  demand  and  supply  is 
effected.  In a perfectly competitive,  many-good  economy,  if the vector of 
prices for  all commodities  is somehow  not equal  to  the vector  (or not an 
element of  the  set of  vectors,  if nonunique)  that achieves market-clearing, 
outputs and  leisure will diverge from a Pareto-optimum.  For  the economy  to 
obtain such  a result would  certainly be  remarkable.  Hypothetical methods  of 
doing so,  such  as  the Walrasian auctioneer,  are  literally implausible and 
often  ridiculed.  Also,  it  is  reasonable to  suppose  that, if exchange  is  vol- 
untary,  such  discrepancies  of  prices from the market-clearing prices wi  11 
result in  a shortfall of commodity  output from its  Pareto-optimum (full 
employment?).  This  is because  either some  marginal  sellers or some  marginal 
buyers  in  each  good  market  will balk at the  terms  of  exchange,  and  transac- 
tions are two-sided.  Monetary  pol  icy can  then affect the workings of  the 
economy  depending on  how  the real quantity of  money  appears  in  the production 
and  uti  1 i  ty  functions,  the nature of price adjustments,  and  how  monetary 
pol  icy is specified.  But  adequate  models  at this level of generality have  not 
been  constructed and  wi  11 probably prove elusive. 
At  a  1  ess  general  1 eve1 , non-market-cl  eari  ng  has  been  coup1  ed  with the 
assumption  that sel  lers satisfy the demand  at current prices.  The  simi 1  ari  ty 
of this type of  model  with the earlier IS-LM models  lies in  the  demand- 
determi  nation of output.  The  newer  types of non-market-cleari  ng model s are 
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that,  in  conjunction with rational expectations,  a1  lows  model  consistency with 
the natural rate property.  In  particular,  output will fluctuate around  a 
"natural" or average  rate that is  uninfluenced by the monetary pol  icy rule and 
that is frequently supposed  to  be  the optimum output level.  In  this kind of 
model,  the nature of  price determination  is crucial. 
It  is  analytically useful  to  distinguish between  two types of  price 
adjustment  mechanisms:  those  in  which all prices change  in  each  period,  and 
those in  which  some  prices do not change  in  each period.  Stabilization policy 
appears  to  have  1  i  ttle  or no  scope  for effectiveness  in  the first  case,  but it 
can  generally be  effective in  the latter.  One  instructive example  of the 
first type is the case  for which prices are completely predetermined one 
period in  advance.  To  enforce consistency  with the natural rate property,  it 
will be  sufficient to  assume  that sellers set period-t prices at the level 
rationally expected  to  clear the market,  conditioned on  realizations of 
variables  in  period t-1: 
(43)  pt =  Etpt, 
where  price expectations  are conditioned on  St  and  pt is the solution to 
(44)  y:(pt,  EtM:-'1  =  y:(pt,  EtM:-',  EtPt+l>. 
In  the latter equation,  M'-'  denotes  the minimal  state vector  truncated  by 
omission of pt.  By  substitution of (15),  (161,  and  (17)  into (441,  and 
using (43)  and  its  obvious  implication pt=Etpt,  it  can  be  shown  that 
prices are determined according to 
(45)  pt=Etpt+l-EtRt+(so-do)dY1+(1-d2)dY1yt-1. 
Then,  solving the system of  equations  (71,  (14),  (15),  (161,  (20),  and  (451, 
and  imposing  rational expectations, it  can  be  shown  that output has  the 
representation: 
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(J1=(al+a,d,+q)-'  1. 
It is immediately apparent  that f, and f,  are irrelevant for output deter- 
mination,  implying that the first  proposition of  Sargent  and  Wallace  holds  in 
this model.  Interestingly,  the conditional mean  Etyt  is  determined 
uniquely by  supply behavior,  whi le  the deviation (yt-Etyt)  i  s determined 
uniquely by demand  behavior,  and  in  precisely the same  fashion as  in  the stat- 
ic  IS-LM model  (compare  equations  (46)  and  (9)).  The  optimal  value of  q  is 
given in  equation  (11). 
As for the  second  proposition of  Sargent and  Wallace,  indeterminacy of 
prices and  money  under  an  "interest rate rule"  of the form (32), it  might  seem 
that predetermination of  prices would  imply determinateness.  It turns out, 
however,  that such  an  intuition is incorrect.  The  solution for the price 
level  is  indeterminate,  as  in  the market-clearing case,  with one  solution hav- 
ing an  undefined  intercept,  and  an  infinite number  of  alternative solutions if 
bootstrap components  are not ruled out.  The  ironic lack of  determinateness 
despi  te predetermi  nation ari  ses  from the forward-looki  ng nature of  expecta- 
tions in  this (or  any)  rational expectations model.  Prices expected  to  clear 
the market  are dependent one-for-one on  expected prices of the period after 
that,  and  so on  into the indefinite future.  An  interest rate rule does  not 
anchor  any  of  these expectations.  This  indeterminateness  also occurs  in  other 
non-market-cleari  ng  models.  Indeed,  it  seems  a necessary  feature of  a1 1 
models  in  which rational expectations play a nontrivial role. 
11 
Another  type of price-adjustment equation in  which  all prices change 
each  period is the familiar partial-adjustment mechanism, 
(47)  (pt-pt-, >  =  p(pl-pt-l)  +  qt,  O<p<l, 
where  q  is a nonautocorrelated  random  variable.  McCallum (1978)  considers 
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for output.  l2  Unfortunately, the optimal  pol  icy rule or, more likely, set 
of policy rules, cannot be adequately characterized, because the ad hoc 
restriction q=O is needed to  render analysis tractable. 
In the second set of non-market-clearing models, some prices do not 
adjust each period.  Fixed-price models were an example treated above.  Models 
of  staggered, multiperiod contracts are particularly  interesting  because they 
can simultaneously possess the natural  rate property and imply policy effec- 
tiveness, even when the authorities have no superior information.  In these 
models, sellers, usually of  labor services, agree to  accept wages or prices 
predetermined for more than one period  in advance. 
To illustrate, suppose that the economy comprises two  equally numbered 
groups of perfectly competitive firms.  In each period, output consists of the 
sum of  the outputs of group 1, Y1,, and of group 2, YZt: 
(48)  Yt=Ylt+YZt. 
Without loss of generality,  let group 1  consist of the firms that signed 
contracts at the end of period  t-1,  to  remain in effect during period t and 
t+l,  while group 2 consists of those whose contracts were signed at the end of 
period t-2,  and expire at the end of  period t.  Wages are set for group i 
based on available information at the end of period t-i.  Further assume the 
production function: 
(49)  Y,  ,=ZtN?,,  i=1,2,  y>O. 
Z is a global productivity variable whose log is  z,=k+c,,  for  some 
constant k and disturbance E,.  The latter is nonautocorrelated and homo- 
scedastic.  N is the (unlogged) employment level.  In the spirit  of the 
contracting models, let the wages contracted for period t by group i  equal the 
expected marginal (physical)  product times the price level: 
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where  P  is the unlogged price level.  Firms  make  output decisions based  on 
contemporaneous  knowledge  of  p,  W,  and  Z.  Then  each  firm's profits are maxi- 
mized by  equating the predetermined wage  with the actual marginal  (physical) 
product times  the price level  : 
(51  W, t=ZtyN:7-1  )Pt,  i=1,2. 
These  two  equations,  the production function (49), and  the  linear approxi- 
mation: 
(52)  yt=(yi t+y2 ,)I2 
imply 
(53)  yt=~o+~(pt-Etpt>+~(pt-Et-lpt)+~2t, 
where  s=y/2( 1  -y) >0, 
and  u~~=(~-~)-'E~. 
Equation  (53)  suggests,  ironically,  that multiperiod contract models  can  be 
represented  as  a particular kind of "generalization" of the Sargent  and 
Wallace market-clearing model. 
The  design of the optimal  policy rule is an  intractable problem in this 
model,  unless  some  ad  hoc  restriction,  such  as  q=O,  is imposed.  Nevertheless, 
some  characteristics of the optimal  policy can  be  deduced.  In  this model,  as 
in  the Sargent  and  Wallace model,  the choice of  q to  reduce output deviations 
is dependent  strictly on  the variances of disturbances  and  the  structural 
parameters  1  inking them  to current output.  The  more  interesting property, 
however,  is that f, and f2  are relevant for output determination,  unlike 
in  the Sargent  and  Wallace model.  This  is because  firmlworker combinations 
under  the older contracts are not making  full use  of the  information set St, 
but,  in  aparticular sense,  are actingas if they knewonly  St-l.'3  The 
policymaker can  use  the  information that is  "ignored,"  in  effect, by  the 
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explain simply,  consider  that pol  icy can  influence output,  according to (531, 
via price level  surprises over one-  and  two-period horizons.  Then  the rele- 
vance  for  output of f,  and f,  and  like terms  in  the policy rule can  be 
indirectly assessed  by asking whether  output is influenced by  expected prices. 
In  fact,  any  tendency  toward persistence of  output fluctuations could be 
eliminated by  a pol  icy rule that made  expected prices vary  in  the following 
way : 
(54)  Etpt =  Et-lpt -  CX(1-y)/ylyt-l. 
As  stated above,  the money  supply  rule or set of rules that effects this pre- 
determined variation in  prices is difficult to  derive. 
Despite  the exi  stence of contracts,  many  economists  suggest  they are 
largely facades.  Perhaps  they are merely means  of exchanging  information 
between  firms and  workers,  but do  not create undesired fluctuations in  out- 
put.  Certainly,  incentives exist to  eliminate,  or at least minimize,  these 
undesired fluctuations.  Nonprice mechanisms  for raising and  lowering real 
wages  may,  at little cost in  efficiency,  substitute for changes  in  explicit 
wages.  Contract provisions regarding overtime pay,  hiring practices,  and 
other aspects  affecting labor costs may  tend  to face the  firm  with a marginal 
labor cost schedule  nearly matching  the rising disutility of work.  To  the 
extent these match,  labor contracts are consistent with optimal output deter- 
mination.  If the match  is imperfect,  then  the optimal  policy will depend  on 
the details of  the mismatch,  how  the mismatch  is  affected by  the policy rule, 
and  variances and  parameters.  While  optimal  q,  f,, and fz  will generally 
take nonzero values,  even  their signs  will be  hard  to assess. 
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As  explained in  the previous  section,  the multiperiod contracting model 
restores a trade-off between output and  price stability somewhat  reminiscent 
of  pre-rational-expectations models.  Yet,  implicit in  both the contracting 
models  and  the Sargent and  Hal  lace model  is  a source of doubt concerni  ng  the 
relevance of this trade-off.  This  doubt  arises from reconsideration of output 
variance as  an  adequate  representation of the obj'ective.  As  mentioned ear- 
l  ier,  real business-cycle model s can  describe fluctuations in  output as 
optimizing responses  to  changing production opportunities facing individual 
agents.  This possibility is  either ruled out or obscured  in  models  in  which 
output i  s demand-determi  ned  (determined by  exogenous  spending propensities and 
monetary and  fiscal policy). 
However,  in  the models  in  which  supply behavior  plays a nontrivial role, 
it  becomes  important  to  ask  what  role productivity changes  play.  For  example, 
in the supply equation  (53) of the contracting model,  the terms  s(pt-Etpt)  and 
s(pt-Et-lpt)  represent  the deviations in  output resulting from the 
inability of workers  and  firms to  develop  Pareto-optimal  contracts;  ones  in 
which output is  determined  by  the appropriate marginal  conditions.  Likewise, 
under  incomplete  information among  suppliers that implied the aggregate  supply 
function (171,  the term s(pt-Etpt)  represents  the deviation of  output 
from its optimum.  In  either case,  the effectiveness of  the additional  con- 
straint on  the economy  that prevents full optimization is  related to  the 
component  of prices that could not be  anticipated in  advance.  If mu1 ti  period 
contracts are considered important,  then  their length will help determine  the 
horizon over  which price-level uncertainty should  be  minimized. 
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tracts appear to  argue even more strongly for price stability over longer 
horizons as a policy criterion, rather than suggesting a policy trade-off 
between output and  price stability.  In general, it is  intuitive that the 
degree of  efficiency of  (incompletely  indexed) nominal  contracts of length n, 
whether for labor, capital, or other factor services, will  depend on price- 
level  predictability over horizons from one to n periods.  At least, this 
statement is obviously true if contracts couple predetermination (or  incom- 
plete indexation) of  nominal  factor payments with Pareto-suboptimal demand- 
determination of  factor quantities, as in the labor contracts supposed empiri- 
cally relevant for unionized firms. 
This conclusion does not immediately provide the optimal  policy rule, of 
course, because, at least in the models considered, price-level  stabilization 
cannot be perfect.  Also, there may be trade-offs between price stabilization 
over various horizons.  For example, attempts to  return prices quickly to  a 
long-established target might clash with the desire to avoid  problems under 
existing contracts, which may already reflect the existing deviation of 
prices.  The weight to be  put on price uncertainty over various horizons will 
depend on the c~nstraints  that incomplete information and contracting models 
describe the economy as being under.  If both kinds of  constraints are rele- 
vant, both kinds of models can contribute to  our understanding of  how monetary 
policy should be designed. 
One "small" change in  the models could make the optimal  policy virtually 
unambiguous.  If the pol  icymaker  i s a1  lowed to  observe the price level  pt 
contemporaneously, it can, to  any arbi  trari  ly exact degree of  accuracy, set it 
on any pre-announced course that eliminated forecast errors over the relevant 
horizons.  Such a rule is: 
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where 8  is a positive magnitude large enough to  prevent significant price 
movements, but not so large as to imply a contradiction:  some deviations in 
prices must be observed in order to  practice this policy. 
Even modest measurement and information-delay  problems concerning prices 
would seem to  call  for something less than complete reliance on current 
prices.  Then, price stability would be  best achieved by  some more complicated 
rule, about which there is  inadequate knowledge, and about which economists 
with different models could disagree.  Nevertheless, consensus among competing 
models on the price-stability criterion is useful  in the absence of  full 
know1  edge or agreement. 
Intertemporal Substitution Models 
The models discussed in  previous sections are variants of  IS-LM models. 
Characteristic of  these is an asymmetry between agents' behavior as suppliers 
and demanders in the commodity market.  This might be rationalized, as imp1  ic- 
itly in contracting models, by  inefficiencies on the supply side arising from 
principal-agent problems.  But firms maximizing the welfare of  the representa- 
tive owner-worker would make output respond to  (ex  ante) real  rates of return 
to labor  (the  variable input).  Models in which both supply and demand respond 
to  real  rates of return are termed intertemporal substitution models and have 
an appealing basis in microeconomic theory.  Such behavior would make supply 
behavior symmetric with respect to  demand behavior, as in: 
(56)  y:  =  S;  +  S:  CRt-Et(pt+l-pt>l  +  Xyt-i +  uzt. 
Then the classical  dichotomy would hold--that  is, output would not be influ- 
enced  by  monetary factors--as shown in the solution for output: 
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the specification of  expectations  formation,  so  long as  they are formed  in  the 
same  manner  by  agents  when  making  supply and  demand  decisions. 
On  the other hand,  differences in  expectation formation affecting supply 
versus demand  decisions would  generate a real-nominal  interaction.  However, 
some  rationale for such  a seemingly bizarre double-consciousness among  agents 
would be  needed  to  provide plausibility.  Alternatively,  some  agents may 
possess  information others do not have.  Various  forms  of  heterogeneity  in  the 
information  sets available to  agents,  St,  have  been  used  to  generate dis- 
parate implications for the optimal  policy rule;  none  appear  to  have  general- 
ity.  In  most  analyses,  the policy space  is  arbitrarily restricted in  ways 
unmotivated,  except by analytical  tractability.  For  example,  policy rules are 
often confined to  those providing trend-stationarity to  nominal  variables,  or 
ruling out cycles  in them.  Also,  just as  in the Sargent and  Wallace model, 
seemingly  small  changes  in  the information assumptions  can  create intractabil- 
ities  or reverse  the signs of  optimal  policy parameters. 
Very  recently,  some  deeper  analysis has  been  undertaken of the micro- 
economic  underpinnings  of potential real-nominal  interactions in intertemporal 
substitution models.  Models  involving a real balance  effect  can  destroy  the 
classical dichotomy  in intertemporal  substitution models.  A  real-nominal 
interaction arises if the transaction services of  money  are considered,  and if 
demand  and  supply are differentially sensitive to the real balance  and  real 
rate arguments.  But  transactions services have  played little  role in  the 
business  cycle models  and  are  thought  to  be  empirically unimportant as  deter- 
minants of  cyclical variations in  output. 
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money  balances on  individuals'  wealth are considered,  the positive relation 
between  real variables and  money  surprises disappears.  False (but rational) 
individual perceptions of higher real wealth,  due  to  a surprise increase in 
nominal  balances,  would  have  two effects on  employment  and  output  that tend to 
be  offsetting.  First,  a direct wealth effect increases  leisure and  reduces 
work.  But,  second,  this effect would  create an  excess  demand  for credit at 
the initial (ex  ante)  real  interest rate.  Therefore,  a higher interest rate 
is  necessary  to clear the  commodity  market.  The  effect of this higher real 
rate on  individual decisions  is  to increase employment  via an  intertemporal 
substitution effect.  (Whether  this rise will  mainly take the form of  changes 
in  nominal  rates or of expected  inflation wi  11  depend,  among  other things, 
upon  the policy rule.)  Barro and  King (1984)  show  that if there are no  stor- 
able goods  and  utility  is  time-separable,  then the  wealth and  substitution 
effects must  identically cancel,  so  that the classical  dichotomy  is con- 
firmed.  Relaxing  the assumptions  to  allow for capital  goods  seems  to suggest 
real rates wi  11  respond by  less in the face of initial real money  balance 
changes,  implying that output would  actually fall from money  increases  not 
perceived by  incompletely  informed agents.  Hence,  conventional  stabilization 
policies are not indicated. 
Practical Policy Implications 
The  role of monetary  pol  icy in  rational expectations models  arises from 
constraints on  private optimization in  the form of incomplete  information or 
limits on  price adjustments.  Properties of policy rules that minimize  the 
welfare losses associated with these  constraints are  very  sensitive to 
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unavailable.  Also, there are unresolved analytical problems.  Thus, the opti- 
mal  policy rule is  unknown, and probably unknowable. 
A characteristic of  a pol  icy that would be  ideal, albeit infeasible, is 
that it  would prevent any price expectation errors over relevant horizons. 
Information  lags facing private agents and the length of  contracts would 
largely determine the relevant horizons.  Long-term contracts, for example, 
argue for policies that achieve longer-term price predictability.  But this 
hypothetical  ideal  is not entirely feasible, because the pol  i cymaker faces 
information constraints regarding current prices. 
The uncertainties and analytical  problems in designing an optimal  pol- 
icy, however, seem to roughly correspond to  the problem of  designing a means 
of minimizing pri  ce-level  uncertainty.  That minimization of  price-level 
uncertainty will  be a property of  an optimal  policy does not necessarily help 
determine an optimal  policy, if prices are not contemporaneously observable. 
However, the price stabi  1 i ty criterion may help rank concrete policy a1  terna- 
tives and evaluate actual  policy performance.  And, to the extent that the 
price level  can be observed by the monetary authorities without significant 
information  delays, price stabilization may be considered not only a good 
pol  icy but a reasonably specific and  practical one.  Certainly, it  is more 
specific and  practical than vague notions that policy should "lean against the 
wind" of  undesired output fluctuations.  Adequate knowledge does not exist to 
differentiate  desirable from undesirable fluctuations, or to know how to  off- 
set them.  Hence, such a "policy" is too obscure to be  a practical, discuss- 
able alternative. 
The major practical alternatives seem to be constant money growth rules 
and predetermined price-level  targets.  The former have often been chosen over 
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money.  This  consideration cannot  be  represented  formally in  models  of the 
sort exhibited in this paper  and  can  have  little  practical force in  the cur- 
rent environment,  in  which money  stock measurement,  or even  conceptual i  zation, 
is  fraught with difficulties. 
The  problems  of  a pol  icy of  close price control are made  less formidable 
by rational expectations.  To  the extent that such  a policy is  practiced con- 
sistently,  private agents  will tend  to  make  decisions that neither reflect 
expectations of,  nor  serve  to  encourage,  fluctuations in  prices.  And  such  a 
policy can  be  practiced without concern for any  supposed output-inflation 
trade-off. 
Exi  sting macroeconomic  model s with rational expectations  provide  1 i  ttle 
support for conventional  monetary  pol i  ci  es.  Output-stabi  1 i  zation pol i  ci  es  are 
not only extremely difficult  to  design,  but,  to  the extent that they are 
"effective,"  tend  to  interfere with the economy's  efficient responses  to 
changing productive opportunities.  Finally,  policies naively directed toward 
interest-rate stabilization or stated in terms  of "interest rate rules" are 
either infeasible or invite unknown,  and  probably  undesired,  consequences. 
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1.  The  linearity restriction,  here and  elsewhere  in  this analysis,  implies a 
general  restriction on utility  and  production functions and  on disturbance 
distributions.  For  example,  quadratic utility  functions,  linear production 
functions,  and  Gaussian  disturbances (in logarithms of  variables) may  suf- 
fice.  Unless  this general  restriction is  upheld,  linearity must  be  regarded 
as  a local approximation. 
2.  If the representation is  not so  sensitive,  then it  is  considered,  accord- 
ing to  a newer  terminology,  a structural model  with respect  to  that range of 
interventions. 
3.  Because,  in  existing macroeconomic  models,  the distinction between  base 
money  and  money  is  irrelevant,  the term money  will be  used  here without loss 
of  generality.  See  Hoehn  (1984)  for a discussion of  some  ways  in  which  the 
di  sti  nction between  base  money  (actual  ly, bank  reserves)  and money  becomes 
important  in  the optimization problem under  a number  of  interesting or his- 
torically relevant regulatory and  institutional frameworks. 
4.  Hoehn  (1984)  deals at length with the derivation of  money  supply functions 
in  empirically relevant and  relatively detailed institutional settings. 
5.  Actually,  this assumption  was  implicit in  the reduction of equation  (1)  to 
equation  (2).  The  requirement  that policy involve an  absolute commitment  to  a 
time-consistent rule implies a restriction on  the policy space  considered. 
The  unrestricted policy space  is (Q X  F)  X  T,  where  T  is the infinite- 
dimensional  time vector.  The  point (Q,F)  could be  specified for each  period 
of  time.  Indeed,  the optimal  policy would  involve a specification of (Q,F)  as 
a function  of time,  where  that function depended  on  the initial conditions. 
But,  in  subsequent  periods,  the initial conditions would change  in  a way  that 
can partly be  predicted on  the basis of the current state.  Then it  wi  11  be 
optimal  to  make  a new  specification of (Q,F)  as  a function of time.  But 
agents,  under  rational expectations,  will expect  this replanning and  take it 
into account,  rendering unattainable  the macroeconomic  outcome  envisioned  when 
the  (Q,F>  as  a function of time was  originally specified.  Then,  the usual 
methods  of  attempting to  determine  the optimal  policy--optimal control 
theory--are inapplicable.  Here,  attention is  restricted to  policies that are 
time-consistent and  must  be  chosen  prior to  observation of the initial condi- 
tions.  The  astute reader  will  note the  irony that the lack of  a constraint on 
policymakers  to  precommit reduces  the policy space  over which  analysis need 
search for an  optimum.  This  provides another  example  of the way  in  which 
rational expectations poses  new  analytical  issues. 
Incidentally,  the optimal  values  of  q and  F  could vary over  time without 
implying time inconsistency,  if the model  is  modified  in  certain ways.  For 
example,  if the structural parameters  were  known,  nonstochastic  functions of 
time,  then a precommi tment  to  fixed paths  for qt and  Ft would  generally be 
appropriate. If  parameters  were  subject to  stochastic variation,  and  agents 
lacked perfect foresight  regarding such  variation,  then the optimal policy 
would  involve precommitment  to  a rule for changing qt and  F,  in  response 
to  available  information.  Finally, if structural parameters  are unknown,  but 
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then the optimal  policy again involves a precommitment  to  a rule for changing 
qt and  F,.  (Some  potential problems  of  model  nonconvergence  are here 
ignored.)  Hence,  the identification of  time consistency of a policy with time 
constancy  of  q and  F is specific to  the class of models  examined  in  this 
paper,  whi ch  impose  structural parameter  constancy and parameter  certai  nty for 
convenience.  In  general,  time  constancy of  q  and  F is sufficient,  but not 
necessary,  for  time consi  stency of  pol  icy. 
6.  Bootstrap  components  in  pt-,,  pt  -,,... are omitted in (26).  This 
omission is  inconsequential  for study of the behavior of  y or the irrelevance 
of  F.  Such  bootstraps would matter for price behavior,  as  discussed  later in 
this section. 
7.  Incidentally,  preannounced  changes  in  fiscal policy are effective in  non- 
IS-LM  models,  such  as  the intertemporal  substitution and  real business  cycle 
models  with rational expectations  and  incomplete information.  Indeed,  in 
these  models,  changes  in  taxes or spending programs  may  have  even  larger 
effects on  private agents if the latter have  time  to  plan their responses  to 
the changes  in  incentives  implied by  fiscal policy changes. 
8.  Sometimes,  solutions under  (32)  are taken to  be  the limiting cases  of 
expressions for  the solutions under  (201,  as  q approaches  infinity.  The 
mathematical  concept of  a  1  imi  t i  s appropriate to  use  when  the value of  a 
function  is  undefined at some  point in  the range  and  values  arbi  trari  ly  close 
to that point are of interest.  Unfortunately,  its use  cannot  be  formally 
justified  as  representing the value of the function at that very point in  the 
range,  if the value  is  undefined  there.  In  the case  at  hand,  if q were 
actually infinite,  rather than arbitrarily large in  magnitude,  then a money 
supply function such  as  (20)  would not exist.  Hence,  any  solutions derived 
using  (20)  would be  irrelevant,  and  the limits of such  expressions as  q 
approaches  infinity cannot  be  regarded  as  outcomes  under  an  "interest rate 
rule."  As  noted,  other analysts have  not taken this view,  and  indeed do 
analyze  an  "interest rate rule" as  a limiting case  of  a money  supply rule,  as 
q approaches  infinity.  This  difference of  view  leads  to  some  rather subtle 
differences of interpretation.  In  particular, McCallum  interprets his results 
(1981)  as  that interest rate rules are feasible,  but only as  limiting cases  of 
money  supply rules.  Further,  these money  supply rules are not unique 
(McCallum  C19861),  hence  the associated  interest rate rule is  not an  adequate 
specification of  policy.  My  interpretation is  that "interest rate rules" are 
not actually policies,  but merely represent outcomes  for the  interest rate 
that occur under  (nonunique)  money  supply rules,  where  only the latter are 
admissible pol i  cies.  These  differences  in  interpretation are probably without 
practical significance for two reasons.  First, either interpretation recom- 
mends  pol  icy rules that include mt  as  an  argument,  that is, money  supply 
rules.  Second,  an  optimal policy would  generally have  a finite$ non-zero 
value of q even if determinacy  were  not at issue.  In  other words,  pol  icies 
that completely predetermine money  or interest rates--often described as 
policies using money  or interest rate "instruments
u--generally are suboptimal 
as  long as  the pol  icymaker  can  observe both contemporaneously,  even  aside from 
problems of determinacy. 
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go and  g1 must  obey:  go=sodo(dlgl+d2-X>+dl  ( 1-X)(do-sold--1  I-'. 
This restriction essentially ensures  equality between  the average  real rate of 
interest and  the natural real rate of interest,  determined in  the commodity 
market. 
10.  Goodfriend (1985,  1986)  considers a policy space  in  which f,  is not 
constrained in this way. 
11.  "Rational  expectations models"  in  which prices are exogenous  are  conceiv- 
able.  Expectations  would  then be  effectively exogenous  as  we1 1,  hence 
anchored.  Other  examples  of rational expectations  models  without the  indeter- 
minacy  problem may  or may  not exist,  but are unl i  kely to  have  the natural  rate 
property or other acceptable microeonomic  implications. 
12.  Nominal  indeterminacy  under  an  "interest rate rule" could also be  shown 
to be  a feature  of this model. 
13.  The  modifier "in a particular sense"  is included because  firmlworker 
combinations  which determined output in  a Pareto-efficient manner,  subject  to 
the constraint  that they could not observe  St,  would  not behave  in  quite the 
same  manner  as  in  the nominal  contracting models,  which  implicitly assume 
Pareto-inefficiency. 
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